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How has cultural relativism been applied by anthropologists in the
study of law and the social contestation on human rights? In this essay the
author explores the concept of cultural relativism as a method of cultural
description

Cultural Relativism, Legal Anthropology and Human Rights
Andrew Price
I am human and nothing human is
alien to me. Terence, 163 B.C.
My own group aside, everything human
is alien to me. Renato Rosaldo
Cultural relativism claims that there is
ethically, morally, and culturally no
absolute truth, and that when observing
another culture one must suspend all
judgments because those judgments are
inherently ethnocentric (Zechenter,
1997). Relativism flourished in the
1930s and 40s with noted
anthropologists such as Boas, Benedict
and Herskovitz. It was during this time
that relativism set forth and combined
two important principles: (1) skepticism
of Western values and (2) tolerance for
other cultural practices (Hatch, 1997).
Not all anthropologists embraced this
idea, in fact some major players in the
field such as Ralph Linton, Robert
Redfield, and A.L. Kroeber were quite
critical of relativism, and to this day
relativism is a theory to be “…more
often attacked than embraced” (Hatch,
1997: 371). Hatch claims that relativism
is flawed in its call for humans to be
nonjudgmental in the face of human
atrocities like genocide, torture, or
female genital mutilation, but also
believes that relativism should not be
thrown out all together. Among
anthropologists it can be said that, in
some respects, most are relativists, and
in other respects, non-relativists. It is
difficult for an anthropologist to suspend
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all moral judgment when observing
another culture, but in many ways this is
the ultimate goal of the observer,
therefore it would be absurd not to
embrace any form or aspect of
relativism.
Relativism essentially has three
different levels of theoretical thinking.
The first level is Descriptive, or Weak
Relativism. This is the most rudimentary
of the three, which simply takes a face
value observational approach under the
premise that every culture is different.
The second level is Normative
Relativism or Strong Relativism, a claim
that because cultures are different,
standards are culturally bound and there
is no way to set “transcultural” moral
and ethical standards. Finally the third
level is Epistemological Relativism or
Extreme Relativism, which has been
endorsed and exemplified by Geertz and
his followers. Geertz believes that
“Humans are shaped exclusively by their
culture and therefore there exists no
unifying cross-cultural human
characteristics” (Zechenter, 1997: 323).
Geertz’s form of relativism states that
because all cultures are mutually
exclusive and therefore existent under
independent cultural factors, there is no
meaningful way of judging any cultural
practice outside of our own. As an
observer, Geertz would argue, any type
of study of another culture, with the
exception of sterile literate
documentation of exact happenings, is
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ethnocentric, inaccurate and therefore an
ideologically tainted practice within the
Social Sciences.
Cultural Relativism is not without its
flaws. Kluckhohn believed that Cultural
relativism is intellectually irresponsible.
If one is to literally act upon the claims
of ethical relativism then one must be so
compelled as to accept any cultural
happenings as legitimate and justified
through the claim and sanctity of culture
difference. For example, Kluckhohn in
the case of Nazism argues under the
theory of cultural relativism, the world
must accept such ideals and actions
because to not accept them and pass
judgment is to be ethnocentric and
ultimately worse than the Nazi rhetoric
itself (Zechenter, 1997). Additionally,
authors such as Allan Bloom have
attacked the theory of cultural relativism.
Cultural relativism, says Bloom, has
created an abundance of Social
Scientists and students who “are unable
and/or unwilling to evaluate cultures”
(Foster, 1991: 257). This type of
thinking in the social sciences essentially
offers no meaningful answers to
questions that continue to plague the
field, such as the concept and application
of human rights to a culturally diverse
global model. Cultural Relativism is not
only flawed, but it assumes that culture
is a static concept completely unaffected
by change, growth, and technology.
Cultural Relativism “…tends to justify
the dysfunctional beliefs and customs of
non-Western cultures while
marginalizing nondominant voices
within those societies” (Zechenter, 1997:
327-328).
Cultural Relativism as a Method
Glazer claims that Cultural Relativism
"is a key methodological concept which
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is universally accepted within the
discipline" (1996) of anthropology. As a
method in anthropology, Cultural
Relativism presumes equality among
cultures and a need for unbiased study to
fully and more accurately understand
cultural phenomena. The general idea is
that cultural relativism provides the
framework for neutral cultural studies in
order to insure that cultures, as Glazer
puts it, are to be judged on their own
cultural merits (1996). Boas used
cultural relativism as new
methodological approach to studying
cultures, and initiated the crossover from
the comparative method, to the
observational and merit based (anticomparative if you will) method.
According to Glazer, to justify his
beliefs, Boas described four limitations
to the comparative method, which are
essentially corrected by the
implementation of cultural relativism:
1. It is impossible to account for
similarity in all the types of culture by
claiming that they are so because of
the unity of the human mind. 2. The
existence like traits in different
cultures is not as important as the
comparative school claims. 3. Similar
traits may have developed for very
different purposed in differing
cultures. 4. The view that cultural
differences are of minor importance is
baseless. (Glazer, 1996).
Under the relativist method a social
scientist would study the traits of a
culture in great detail while taking into
account the culture as a whole and that
cultural bleed off of traits into
neighboring cultures (Glazer, 1996)
must also be taken into account in order
to grasp and appreciate culture as an
isolated and independent phenomenon. It
December 2002
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was believed by Boas that this
methodology would allow
anthropologists "(1) to understand the
environmental factors that shape a
culture, (2) to explain the psychological
factors that frame the culture, and (3) to
explain the history of a local custom"
(Glazer, 1996). Ultimately cultural
relativism can be viewed as Boas'
establishment of an inductive
methodology for anthropology as well as
the rest of the social sciences. In using
an inductive form of methodology and
discarding the comparative method,
anthropologists would be able to better
study cultures solely on the merits of the
accumulated data, and not with a biased
cross cultural comparison.
The
Application
of
Cultural
Relativism To Human Rights Issues
Perhaps the greatest, or most
widespread, application of cultural
relativism is in the area of human rights
and the analysis of cross cultural belief
systems. In the article Human Rights,
Human Difference: Anthropology’s
Contribution to an Emancipatory
Cultural Politics, Terence Turner
discusses the concepts of fundamental
human rights and the application of
Cultural Relativism to these rights.
Human Rights, Turner claims, is the idea
that somehow as a person or peoples
there exists an intrinsic and inherent
right to certain privileges such as the
right to not get tortured, the right to
freedom, or even the right to equal
opportunities. Exactly how or what
enables a person to claim such concepts
as being universal does present
problems. “The ability to make such
claims is often assumed to imply or
presuppose the existence of some
institutional means of enforcing them,
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binding on the society that recognizes
the rights in question (normally the state
or mechanism such as the feud in
stateless societies)” (Turner, 1997: 274275).
Does there always exist an institution
or mechanisms to enforce rights that
someone claims to have? Is it legitimate
for anyone to claim anything and have
his or her views of rights legitimized
under the sovereignty of Cultural
relativism? Turner suggests that there
may be difficulty in claiming that human
rights are universal, especially when it is
being applied to non-universal concepts
which such as social institutions and
States. Social institutions and states are
unique happenings that occur in some
cultures but not others. Is it possible to
claim a universal “right” in a nonuniversal situation? Applying the
Western ideal of rights gets sticky when
attempting to apply them to non-western
models because of Cultural Relativism
stepping in and pulling the
ethnocentrism card.
The origins of human rights are
primarily a Western concept. It has been
Western culture that has formulated and
produced the idea that humanness is a
possession of the individual in question,
and that this possession of humanness
entitles the individual to rights.
Furthermore, when individuals come
together, as in the case of a society or
culture, the humanness of the collect
somehow, in the western ideal, merits
collective rights. Turner questions
whether or not a universal principle of
right is incompatible with Cultural
Relativism. “For many anthropologists,
of course, ‘cultural relativism’ is not a
fully developed theoretical position but,
rather, a commitment to suspending
moral judgment until an attempt can be
made to understand another culture’s
December 2002
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beliefs and practices” (Turner, 1997:
275).
Cultural Relativism is nothing more
than a universal claim that presumes that
all cultures are one in the same. For this
to be true it must be proven that all
cultures posses the same qualities and
beliefs towards social value of the
individual, therefore giving inherent
personal rights. In addition, scholars
such as Messer discuss the topics of
Cultural Relativism and Anti-Cultural
Relativism and their applications to
Universalism. Messer states that there
are essentially two reasons that
anthropologists have been opposed to
Universalistic claims: (1) Universalist
claims reject the concept of individual
rights as being universally self-evident.
In 1947 the American Anthropological
Association (AAA) issued a statement of
international human rights saying,
“…standards and values are relative to
the culture from which they derive”
(293). (2) Rejection also comes from a
belief that ‘individual rights” are
Western and therefore ethnocentric.
Some anthropologists also distrust the
idea of international human rights
because its implementation creates
instruments of arbitration and a global
morality, which can over-ride and
supercede a cultural community and its
values. Anti-cultural Relativists seem to
put forth many of the same concerns as
that of the Cultural Relativist. They both
argue that modern human rights are
distinctly different from all other cultural
rights traditions because “specific
cultural expressions of moral or social
rights, however worthy and protective of
human dignity, are not “human” rights.
Under this assumption, those who follow
the Anti-Relativist perspective also
follow the U.N. human rights legal
system as being a legitimate source for
CS&P Volume 1, Inaugural Issue
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arbitration and a global moral order, and
a legitimate expression for the peace and
security of individuals worldwide.
The case for universal human rights is
rooted in historically western precedents.
A drafting of these rights for the specific
implementation of them upon humanity
began in the late 1940s out of the
aftermath of the Holocaust and
proceedings of the Nuremberg trials. The
roots for the appeal to universal human
rights is also an extension of classic
western thinking beginning with Greek
philosophy, Roman law, Judeo-Christian
tradition, Reformation humanism, and
Enlightenment philosophy. This
ideology further progresses with
examination of historical documents
such as the Magna Carta, the United
States Declaration of rights, and the
French Declaration of the Rights of Man
and the Citizen (Messer, 1997).
It is worthy of noting that all such
thinking and documentation was and is
merely a self-serving testament to selfpreservation typically put forth by those
in power to further promote their own
interests. Such Western thought is also
notably the result of works done by
white land-owning males, and can be
construed as simply a means to preserve
their heightened standards of living over
the norm population of the time. While
this remains a predominantly western
fact, there has been other cultural
philosophy’s disputing such types of
cultural promotions of self-interests.
Asian philosophy has argued that the
concept of political rights is non-existent
and therefore foreign to the traditions of
the Asian cultures. The focus of Asian
culture has primarily been based on
subsistence needs rather the civil
liberties of its peoples. Western
authorities, historically, have given
precedence to civil and political rights
December 2002
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and by and large ignore the cultural
socio-economic rights of any groups of
people that are not Western. There is a
tendency among these policy makers to
disregard, if not completely throw-out
the “…development or collective rights
as derivative rights that compromise and
gut the individual human rights concept”
(Messer, 1997: 299).
There is a certain amount of agreement
between the Cultural Relativist and the
Anti-Relativist, they agree that there
does exist, in cultures, the concept of
right and wrong. Legal language has
called for black and white areas in
human difference and thus helps create a
culturally global universal concept of
rights and wrongs. The result is a
“single universal formulation” (Messer,
1997: 312), which dictates and
elaborates on what is acceptable
universally as the definition of human
rights.
Anthropology and the Law
Legal anthropology, once just a small
sub-field of anthropology concerned
primarily with the study non-Western
legal systems, now encompasses the
Western, industrial, and transnational
legal matters. “Its scope includes
transnational treaties, legal
underpinnings of transnational
commerce, the field of human rights,
diasporas and migrants, refugees and
prisoners and other situations not easily
captured in the earlier communitygrounded conception of anthropology”
(Moore, 2001: 95).
Law, is often perceived to be culturally
“tradition-driven”, “however culture is
simply a label denoting durable customs,
ideas, values, habits, and practices”
(Moore, 2001: 96). Law is not
necessarily a culture, as some may note
it to be, but rather a part of the package,
CS&P Volume 1, Inaugural Issue
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which makes the whole. Moore also
claims that law can be viewed as a mask
for elitist interests and that “law purports
to be about furthering the general
interest, but really serves the cause of the
powerful, generally capitalists and
capitalism” (2001: 96). Furthermore law
is used as a tool for a rationalist
framework within the profession. Moore
cites law, particularly Western law, as a
social concept of “problem-solving”, and
thus a tool to solve frequently occurring
problems within a given culture (2001),
and more recently, a problem solving too
to deal with problems created by crosscultural borders.
Law is power, and as Laura Nader
clearly states throughout her work, to
understand law is to understand how
power works. To understand law and
power, Nader has turned to non-Western
cultures to explore what she refers to as
the “ ‘Harmony of Law’ model, which
encapsulates coercive compromise and
consensus as a form of behavior
modification” (1997: 712). Among the
Zapotec Indians, Nader has noticed, a
similarity between their indigenous court
system and “international negotiation
settings” (1997). “ I began to understand
that the coercive power of legal
ideologies had been missed by
anthropologists caught up in a romantic
notion of culture” (Nader, 1997: 712).
Among the Zapotec, Nader has found
the use of the harmony law model to be
unique. Nader notes that the concept of
harmony law was most likely introduced
by the Spanish as a hegemonic tool, but
that they “had began using it as a tool for
restricting the encroachment of external,
superordinate [sic] power” (1997: 213)
thereby turning Harmony law into a
counter-hegemonic tool used to ward
against unwanted cross cultural
influences. Nader’s work represents
December 2002
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clearly how a culture can use law for a
two fold purpose; the first being social
regulation of community legal problems
in an attempt to satisfy social harmony,
and the second being a defense
mechanism against outside influence and
the unwanted reconstructing of the
cultural accept values of legal
community rights.
Law, Cultural Relativist Linked to
Human Rights
In his article in the Journal of Foreign
Affairs, Franck discusses, candidly, the
effects, disobedience, and want of
personal freedom from international
regulation of laws and human rights
doctrine through cross-cultural
examples.
The Taliban, May 2000, who rule most
of Afghanistan, order a mother of seven
to be stoned to death in front of ecstatic
men and children, in order to restitute for
her crime of adultery. One-year prior,
the House of Lords, provided refuge, for
two Pakistani women who were accused
of adultery, inside the UK. The reason:
Had they stayed in Pakistan, they were
surely to be at risk of public torture and
possibly stoned to death in the home
(Franck, 2001). In the face of all of this
controversy of forbidding women to
access public education, and leave the
home unaccompanied, they (the Taliban)
demand to be left alone in their religious
beliefs and cultural standards just as the
average American requests. “ Leaders in
Kabul insist that they not be judged by
the norms of others – especially in the
West” (Franck, 2001: 191).
The Taliban are not the only group
who request the same treatment in the
world arena, and reject such outside
scrutiny. Franck points out that much the
same request exist in the United States,
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the same power house that frequently
pulls “call for fairness” cards on others.
“Florida, after frying several prisoners in
a faulty electric chair, has only
reluctantly turned to other methods of
execution to conform to the U.S.
Constitution’s prohibition of ‘cruel and
unusual punishment’” (Franck, 2001:
191-192). He further points out that
when many of our western allies claim
that it is barbarous to have any
executions, politicians ask them to mind
their own business and respect the way
they deal with citizens – just as the
Taliban asks.
These arguments have stemmed from a
common cause among many nations.
The thriving of human rights, postwar,
has created two elements, dynamic to the
issue: globalization and individualization
(Franck, 2001). Globalization has
created common standards of protections
for all peoples in what Franck (2001)
refers to as a “decentralized” world,
through monitoring human rights
violations and requiring compliance
from cultures not wanting to comply, but
simply have their cultural differences
respected. Jamaica is a significant case
exemplifying cultures that wish to have
their belief systems respected. After the
Commission of Experts representing the
ICCPR (International Covenant of Civil
and Political Rights) chastised Jamaica
for the administration of the death
penalty (an act the US is continually in
violation of with no reprimanding),
“Jamaica responded by withdrawing
from the ICCPR”(Franck, 2001: 1993).
Jamaica’s response was consistent with
many other countries, “respect our
culture, our unique problems” (Franck,
2001: 193). In addition, most cultures,
which come under scrutiny of the
ICCPR, see this as an outright attack on
there own legal and cultural identity.
December 2002
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While the Western authorities may view
the Taliban’s actions as militant,
barbarous, and socially deplorable, the
Taliban has a much different
perspective. They see themselves as
“guardians of a religion and culture that
should be exempted from a “Western”
system of human rights” (Franck, 2001:
195) and most of all exempt from having
to abide by and succumb to international
laws established by NATO (of which
they are not a member). Again, as
Franck has stated, this mimics the same
views on international laws and
regulations that the Western cultures
have when they violate the ICCPR for
the sake of cultural and social
preservation of ways, rights and means.
Conclusion
Cultural Relativism, as a theory, method
and application, possesses a great
amount of responsibility to the field of
Anthropology, as well as the greater
Social Science system. With its theory
based upon the assumption that cultures,
and the individuals within those cultures,
possess an inherent right to be sovereign
from all judgment from any other culture
system, this leaves very little room in the
case for a universal human rights
system. But the gaps and unanswered
flaws of Relativism continue to plague
arguments in favor of protecting a
legitimate scenario of peoples and
cultures being able to believe and
practice as the wish without
repercussions from a standardized global
hierarchy. While many of the teachings
by Anthropologists such as Boas and
Geertz, have been both debunked and
thrown out of most major
Anthropological and Social Science
thoughts and practices, Cultural
Relativism’s major premise of simply
CS&P Volume 1, Inaugural Issue
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observing a culture at face value still
stands today as a standard practice of
field data gathering. Perhaps the greatest
contribution of Cultural Relativism, to
the Social Sciences, and the world
culture as a whole, is the establishment
of cultural tolerance and a better attempt
at non-ethnocentric cross-cultural
observations.
Furthermore, the study of law in
anthropology is unlike legal studies of
any other field. While law may typically
be seen a tradition-driven mechanism by
cultures, scholars such as Moore and
Nader have expressed that law is not its
own separate culture, but a part of the
grand sum of a greater culture, and that
the particular culture determines the
modifications of law, not the other way.
The understandings of law, as Nader
believes, can come only through an
understanding of power and how that
power works. Cultures use power as a
two fold tool, the first being social
regulation of community legal problems
in an attempt to satisfy social harmony,
and the second being a defense
mechanism against outside influence and
the unwanted reconstructing of the
cultural accept values of legal
community rights.
Finally, legal rights and human rights
become sticky issues when they are
applied cross culturally. With different
beliefs systems it is hard enough for
different cultures to see eye to eye, but
the difficulty in understanding only
increases when all cultures are required,
by law and sanction, to operate under the
same premise. It would seem that even
the West, the primary developers of the
ICCPR and human rights doctrine have a
difficult time adhering to its own law
and beliefs, ultimately reverting to the
same justifications of the violations:
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“respect our culture, our unique
problems” (Franck, 2001: 193).
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